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Multi-Period Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryover:  





The majority of theoretical and experimental research stemming from Tullock’s (1980) model of rent-
seeking considers static, single-period contests. This paper contributes to a growing body of research on 
multi-period rent-seeking contests by developing and experimentally testing a model in which a player’s 
effort affects the probability of winning a contest in both the current and future periods. Theory predicts 
that rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward from later to earlier periods, with no change in overall 
rent-seeking expenditures relative to the static contest. Experimental results indicate a significant shift 
forward when “carryover” is present and that the amount shifted is directly related to the carryover rate. 
Finally, although experimental expenditures are greater than the equilibrium predictions, overall rent-
seeking effort in the carryover contests is lower than in similar static contests. 
  
JEL classification: D72; C91 
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Introduction 
Rent-seeking refers to the expenditure of resources by economic agents in an effort to win a 
contest when the expenditure does not directly contribute to the contest’s prize. Examples of rent-seeking 
contests include Olympic bidding, corporate lobbying for a monopoly license or government contract, and 
special interest lobbying for income redistribution programs.
1 Tullock (1967, 1980) developed what is 
perhaps the most widely used model of rent-seeking and recognized that, because otherwise productive 
resources are used to compete for the rent, rent-seeking results in a social welfare loss.   
The majority of theoretical and experimental research stemming from Tullock’s (1967, 1980) 
model of rent-seeking focuses on static, single-period contests. This paper contributes to a growing body 
of research on multi-period rent-seeking contests by developing and experimentally testing a model in 
which a player’s effort affects the probability of winning a rent-seeking contest in both the current and 
future periods. That is, we allow for the possibility that some rent-seeking expenditures carryover from 
one-period to the next. Lobbying for a government contract provides an example of such a contest if 
contracts are re-awarded periodically. In this case, a firm may invest in physical and social capital that 
benefits it in future contests even if it loses the current contest. Because many rent-seeking situations 
involve consecutive rounds, it should be of interest to understand how agent behavior in a multi-period 
rent-seeking game differs from that in a standard single-period game.  
The rent-seeking theory developed here predicts that, relative to multiple periods of a non-
carryover rent-seeking game, rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward from later to earlier periods.  As 
such, no change in total rent-seeking expenditures is predicted relative to the similar non-carryover 
contest. The experimental results support our theory in that we find a significant shift forward in rent-
seeking expenditures when carryover between periods is allowed. In addition, we find that the shift 
forward in rent-seeking effort is positively correlated to the rate of carryover. Finally, although mean 
subject expenditures are greater than the equilibrium predictions, overall expenditures are lower in our 
two-period carryover contest relative to our baseline non-carryover contest.    4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first present a rent-seeking model where a 
positive proportion of effort carries over from one-period to the next. We then outline an experimental 
design and procedure to test the theory. Next, we briefly review the relevant experimental studies 




Rent-seeking with no carryover 
Our rent-seeking model is based on that of Tullock (1980).  Assume that n identical risk-neutral 
players compete for a rent (γ) by expending effort xi (i = 1,…, n)
 and that the probability that player i wins 
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Equation (2) is equivalent to Tullock’s (1980) single-period contest expected payoff function when c = 1.
2 
The well-known symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) to the above game is 
2
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Rent-seeking with carryover 
  In a repeated game context, expenditure carryover implies that rent-seeking expenditures made by 
player i in period t not only affect the probability player i will win the prize in period t but also the   5
probability that player i will win a prize in future periods or contests. Therefore, the probability of 
winning the prize in period t is a function of current and past expenditures, or 
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A reasonable assumption is that total expenditures carryover from one-period to the next at a rate 
δ , where  1 0 ≤ ≤ δ . This is equivalent to assuming that expenditures depreciate at a rate of  δ − 1 from 
period t-1 to period t. Assuming that carryover is available for all players and that  i δ = k δ  for all i and k, 


































γ .       ( 5 )  
Rent-seeking effort, or investment, in any period increases the probability of winning in the current and 
all remaining periods. If  0 = δ , there is no carryover of expenditures from one round to the next.  
Each player i chooses an investment in period t to maximize his expected payoff over all 
remaining periods. Assuming the contest is repeated for T periods and that the same prize amount γ is re-







































































We impose the further restriction that expenditures in each period must be non-negative.  
The symmetric, pure strategy, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is found through recursive 
substitution of the first-order condition from each period, starting with the final period T and moving 
backward to period 1.
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To preclude the possibility of negative rent-seeking expenditure in the final period, we must impose the 




4 Note that only the expenditures for the first and the last periods depend on the 




 times the single-period NE level 
(given by equation (3)). Thus, first-period expenditures increase as the rate of carryover increases, but, 
due to the non-negativity constraint, reach a maximum of twice the single-period NE when δ  equals ½. 
Similarly, equilibrium expenditures in the final period are 
) 1 (





 times the single-period NE level (i.e. 
less than the NE). Equilibrium final period expenditures decrease as the rate of carryover increases, 
reaching a minimum of zero when δ  equals ½. The equilibrium for all intermediate periods is equal to 
the single-period NE.  Thus, optimal expenditures in a multi-period rent-seeking contest with carryover 
are shifted forward from the last period to the first period as the rate of carryover increases. 
The intuition behind equations (7) – (9) is straightforward. Consider a two-period contest in 
which expenditures in the first period carry over to the second period at a rate δ . When δ  is zero, the 

















. Now, consider the 
equilibrium total investment by all participants in the last period when there is carryover. Taking first-  7
period expenditure (and, thus, carryover) as given, it is still optimal to have a total investment in the last 
period equal to the single-period NE level because the marginal benefit and marginal cost of investment 
are unchanged. In other words, the final period of the game has no carryover incentives and is thus the 
same as a single-period game. Therefore, in the final period, participants merely make up the difference 
between the single-period NE level and what is carried over. Taking the solution for period 1 given by (7) 
and remembering that δ times this amount carries over to second round, the result in (9) is clear. 
Using backward induction and considering the first period, participants have an incentive to 
increase their first-period investment beyond the single-period NE level, and reduce their second period 
investment by an amount that just offsets the carryover. The marginal cost of investment in the first 
period is essentially reduced when there is carryover because a player can decrease his second period 
investment by δ , leaving the probability of winning in the last period unchanged, and recover some of 
the cost of the additional first-period investment. Specifically, there is a cost-savings of  δ c from the 
reduction in second-period investment that must be considered in the first period. Therefore, the marginal 
cost of investment in the first period is reduced to  ) 1 ( δ − c . This fact is reflected in the solution given by 
(7).  This leaves (8) to be explained. 
If one expands the above example to include more than two periods, the argument above implies 
that the marginal cost of investment in all periods except the last is actually  ) 1 ( δ − c . For example, by 
increasing one’s investment in the current period by one, investment in the very next period could be 










 in every period except the last. However, with the exception of the first 



































, the single period NE level.   8
Note also that the total level of expenditures (carryover included) is equal to the single-period NE 
expenditures in the final period, and is higher in all other periods. However, total rent-seeking expenditure 
(that is, the sum of all new expenditure) is exactly the same in the model with carryover as in a T-period 
model with no carryover. That is, the fact that expenditures do not depreciate completely from round to 
round does not increase or reduce the predicted level of resources devoted to rent-seeking in equilibrium 
(i.e., rent dissipation). The intuition for this last result stems directly from the fact that the increase in 
equilibrium first-period expenditures with carry-over relative to no carry-over 
(
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) is exactly equal to the reduction in final-period expenditures with 
carry-over relative to no carry-over (
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). With new 
expenditures in all intermediate rounds exactly equal to the single-period NE expenditures, total 
expenditures in the T-period model with carryover are exactly equal to total expenditures in the T-period 
model with no carryover. Expenditures are perfectly shifted from the last period to the first period. 
Baik and Lee (2000) model a similar multi-stage rent-seeking contest, and comparison of our 
results to theirs is worthwhile. In their model, two groups of individuals compete for a private rent in a 
two-stage contest. A “winner” from each group is selected via a Tullock-like contest in the first stage, and 
these two winners then compete for the prize in a second contest. In one variant of the model (player-
specific carryover) a fraction of the individual winners’ effort in stage 1 carries over to stage 2. In a 
second variant (group-specific carryover) a fraction of each group’s aggregate effort accompanies each 
winner to the stage 2 contest. 
Baik and Lee find that total rent dissipation increases with the carryover rate when carryover is 
player-specific, and that outlays increase in the first stage and decrease in the second stage with a higher 
carryover rate. They find, however, that rent dissipation is independent of the carryover rate when 
carryover is group-specific. Group-specific carryover simply affects the distribution of effort between the 
two stages. While our results are not directly comparable because the institutions are different, they are   9
qualitatively the same as in Baik and Lee’s group-specific carryover variant. The similarity in the results 
is due to the fact that in our model all participants continue to the second period and, therefore, a fraction 
of the aggregate group investment carries over as well. 
Gradstein and Konrad (1999) compare effort levels in a multi-stage rent-seeking contest to those 
in the Tullock-like, simultaneous contest. They model a multi-stage rent-seeking contest in which the 
winner from the first stage is allowed to continue to compete in the second stage. They find that the rules 
of the contest determine whether more effort is expended under a multi-stage or a simultaneous contest. 
Specifically, when the winner of a contest is determined by random factors rather than by the individual 
expending the most effort, total effort from the group is maximized under the multi-stage contest.    
 
Experimental Design, Procedures and Hypotheses 
The experiments reported here were designed to test the carryover model described above, 
provide a direct comparison of subject behavior in similar non-carryover and carryover rent-seeking 
environments, and to provide insight into the role experience plays in carryover rent-seeking 
environments. We conducted 20 experimental sessions. The first 10 experimental sessions were divided 
into two parts – a non-carryover rent-seeking environment (Part I) followed by a carryover environment 
(Part II).  The remaining 10 experimental sessions consisted of only one part – a carryover environment 
(Part II).
 5  
Part I consisted of five decision rounds. At the beginning of each Part I round, subjects were 
paired using a random assignment process, and each subject was endowed with $1.50 which they could 
use to purchase “raffle tickets” to win a monetary prize of $1.20. Subjects were allowed to buy tickets in 
blocks of 100 at a cost of 10¢ per block. The prize was awarded to one subject in each pair, based on a 
draw where the probability of winning the prize for a subject was equal to the number of tickets 
purchased by the subject divided by the total number of tickets purchased by the pair.
6 
As in Part I, Part II consisted of five decision rounds and subjects were re-paired using a random 
assignment process at the beginning of each round. However, each round involved two periods (contests)   10
played against the same opponent. Each of the two periods within a round involved a rent-seeking contest 
identical (including prize and endowment amounts) to those in Part I, except that a portion of the tickets 
purchased by a subject in the first period of each round carried over into the second period of that round. 
However, tickets did not carryover from one round to the next – only within rounds. Thus, each of the 
five rounds consisted of a two-period carryover contest. For ten of the experimental sessions, a ‘low’ 
carryover rate of ¼ was used.  The remaining ten sessions used a ‘high’ carryover rate of ½. For example, 
if a subject purchased 1000 tickets in the first period, ¼ * 1000 = 250 tickets would carry over into the 
second period for the low carryover sessions, whereas ½ * 1000 = 500 tickets would carryover in the high 
carryover sessions. For each carryover rate (low and high) five experimental sessions consisted of Parts I 
and II, while the other five experimental sessions consisted of only Part II. When assessing differences in 
decisions between similar non-carryover and carryover rent-seeking environments, we compare the Part I 
decisions only to the Part II decisions collected in those sessions without a Part I, thus maintaining 
independence of observations. We also assess the role of experience in carryover rent-seeking 
environments by comparing the Part II decisions from the sessions that include a Part I to those that did 
not.   
For the sessions in which subjects played both Part I and Part II, at the beginning of each session 
the experimenters informed the subjects that the experiment would consist of two parts. Subjects were 
then given detailed instructions about Part I (see Appendix I for Part I and II instructions). After 
completion of the five one-period rounds, the subjects were given further instructions detailing Part II of 
the experiment. For the sessions in which subjects played only Part II, the subjects were given detailed 
instructions about Part II (although the instructions did not indicate this was Part II). In addition, in all 
experimental sessions, subjects were given an expected payoff table and an expected earnings calculator 
for both Parts I and II (at the appropriate time) that showed the expected earnings associated with 
different combinations of ticket purchases.
7 The experimenters explained how to use these tables and 
calculators during the instructions. The calculators allowed subjects to choose the number of tickets 
purchased by themselves and their opponent and displayed the expected earnings for both players. After   11
subjects read the instructions, the experimenter summarized them, answered questions, and provided an 
example.  
During Part I of an experiment, subjects indicated their decisions regarding how many tickets to 
purchase by filling in the desired number on a decision sheet. This was done without knowledge of who 
they were paired with or how many tickets were purchased by the other subject. At the end of each round, 
subjects were informed whether they won the prize, their earnings for the round, and the number of 
tickets purchased by the player with whom they had been matched.
8 Subjects were not given information 
about any other contest. Also, subjects were not able to use their endowment or winnings from one round 
to purchase tickets in any other round. During Part II subjects were required to make their ticket purchase 
decisions for both periods of a round before handing in their decision sheet. Subjects were then told 
whether they won the prize in either of the periods, their earnings from the round, and the number of 
tickets purchased by their opponent in both periods of the round.   
  This means that a subject was required to make the second period decision before learning the 
outcome of the first period. This does not alter the theoretical outcome as described by our model. In fact, 
making the first and second period decision simultaneously is theoretically no different than making the 
first period decision, learning the outcome of the first period (but not the expenditures of the opponent) 
and then making the second period decision. In addition, we recognize that two possible situations can 
arise regarding the role of inter-period information in a rent-seeking game with carryover. Players can 
either know or not know the expenditures their opponent(s) made in previous periods before making their 
expenditure decision for the next period. Both situations are likely to occur in real rent-seeking situations. 
For example, a firm that is competing for a renewal of a contract may be able to learn about an 
opponent’s previous rent-seeking activities through observation or public record. However, because there 
is often an incentive to keep many rent-seeking activities private, due to legal or competitive reasons, and 
because many rent-seeking activities are difficult to observe, it also is likely that many rent-seeking 
situations involve players making subsequent expenditure decisions without knowing an opponent’s 
previous expenditures. Our experimental rent-seeking design models this latter case. That is, players in   12
multi-period contests with carryover do not know opponent expenditures in prior periods before making 
their current period decision. 
  Based on the parameters used for the low carryover design (γ = 1200, c = 1, n = 2, and δ = ¼) the 
symmetric NE for the one-period contest is for each subject to purchase 300 tickets. The subgame perfect 
equilibrium (SPE) for the two-period carryover contest is for each subject to purchase 400 tickets in the 
first period and 200 tickets in the second period. In the high carryover design (which maintains the same 
parameters except δ = ½), the NE for the one-period contest is unchanged at 300 tickets, but the SPE for 
the two-period carryover contest is 600 tickets in period 1 and zero tickets in period 2.   
 
Results 
  The subjects in our experiments were paid volunteers recruited from economics classes at 
American University. Prior to volunteering, subjects were told that they would participate in a decision 
making exercise and be paid in cash an amount that would depend on their decisions and the decisions of 
others in the experiment. The experimental sessions in which subjects participated in both Part I and Part 
II, lasted approximately 1.5 hours, and subject earnings (which included a $10 participation payment) 
averaged about $34.75. The experimental sessions in which subjects participated in only Part II lasted 
approximately 1 hour, and subject earnings (which included a $10 participation payment) averaged about 
$26.65. All payments were made privately at the end of the experimental session. 
 
Previous experimental studies 
A small but growing segment of the rent-seeking literature involves using laboratory 
experimental methods to test the predictive power of Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking model. Most of these 
studies involve a basic symmetric two-player rent-seeking game without carryover. However, it is 
instructive to provide a brief overview of these studies as the non-carryover portion of our experiment 
meets this description.    13
Millner and Pratt (1989) were the first to experimentally test the predictive power of Tullock’s 
(1980) rent-seeking model. Participants in their experimental design could adjust expenditures within a 
timed decision round. Millner and Pratt observed mean expenditures greater than the Nash equilibrium.
9  
In response to these findings, Shogren and Baik (1991) present the results of a series of experiments that 
utilize an explicit payoff matrix.
10 This payoff matrix gives the participants the exact payoffs for every 
possible outcome making it easier for participants to identify the NE. With this payoff matrix, they find 
that mean expenditures are insignificantly different from the NE. However, because each participant was 
repeatedly matched with the same opponent for the duration of the experiment, their lower expenditures 
could be explained by cooperation arising from repeated play. Potters, et al (1998) use an explicit payoff 
matrix as in Shogren and Baik, but randomly rematch participants at the beginning of each round, 
consistent with the one-shot nature of Tullock’s theory. They find that mean expenditures are greater than 
the NE. Similarly, Davis and Reilly (1998), while investigating the effects of rent-defending buyers, also 
find rent-seeking expenditures that are significantly higher than the NE.  
Millner and Pratt (1991), in an effort to explain their earlier results, consider the effects of 
individual risk preferences on rent-seeking expenditures. Using a two-stage experiment, they find that 
mean expenditures for a relatively less risk-averse group significantly exceed the NE whereas those for a 
relatively more risk-averse group are insignificantly different than the NE.  Önçüler and Croson (1998) 
develop and experimentally test a Tullock-like rent-seeking model that incorporates a risky rent via a two-
stage game. They find mean expenditures to be significantly greater than predicted. Overall, the majority 
of experimental rent-seeking studies find mean expenditures to be greater than or, in some instances, 
insignificantly different than the Nash equilibrium. We now turn to the results of the experiment 
performed for this study. 
 
Results from non-carryover contests 
  This section reports the results from the first five rounds of the 10 experimental sessions that 
included Part I. Figure 1 presents the frequency distribution for ticket purchases. Figure 2 presents the   14
average ticket purchase per round. Because there were 9 experimental sessions with 10 participants, one 
session with 8 participants, and each participant made a ticket purchase for each of the five one-period 
contests, there were a total of 490 recorded decisions.    
Because subjects played five one-period contests, there may be interdependence between rounds. 
We use a subject’s average level of investment from all five rounds to compare across treatments using a 
Mann-Whitney U test (all p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise specified). Consistent with the 
experimental results of the majority of previous symmetric two-person rent-seeking contests, and the 
literature on “bubbles” and false equilibria (see Sunder (1995), or Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) 
for examples), we find that mean ticket purchases generally exceed the NE prediction (300 tickets). Mean 
ticket purchases across all no-carryover rounds was 527.2. The deviation from the NE prediction is 
statistically significant, and this result is robust across our multi-period contests as well. The presence of 
over-investment in numerous experimental studies suggests that it is not the result of subjects 
misunderstanding the decision environment. It may be the case that some factors that are not considered 
in the formal models (such as a non-monetary benefit associated with winning) influence subject 
decisions. In the one-shot contests used here, 2 percent of subjects purchased tickets in excess of the value 
of the prize, and 3.3 percent of subjects purchased tickets equal to the value of the prize, suggesting that 
winning may be a component in a subject’s utility. Because mean rent-seeking expenditures in each of 
our experimental designs exceed the equilibrium predictions, and because this is fully consistent with 
previous experimental studies, we focus in the remainder of the paper primarily on the other comparisons 
of interest. 
 
Results for the low carryover design 
  This section reports the results for the sessions with a ‘low’ carryover rate of ¼.  Figures 3a and 
3b present the frequency distribution of ticket purchases in the first and second periods for sessions in 
which subjects were inexperienced (not having completed Part I) and experienced (having completed Part 
I), respectively.  For the inexperienced design, there were five sessions with 10 participants; because each   15
subject made a ticket purchase in each period of the five rounds, there were a total of 500 recorded 
decisions. For the experienced design, there were four sessions with 10 participants and one session with 
8 participants, for a total of 480 recorded decisions. Table 1 presents the raw data and summary statistics. 
  Average ticket purchases in the first period were 552.4 tickets for the inexperienced sessions and 
541.25 tickets for the experienced sessions; for the second period the average ticket purchases were 364.8 
in the inexperienced sessions and 293.5 in the experienced sessions.  Differences in ticket purchases 
between experienced and inexperienced subjects were not statistically significant in either period (p = 
0.506, and p = 0.376, respectively Mann-Whitney U test).  The SPE for the contests with a carryover rate 
of ¼ is 400 tickets for period one and 200 tickets for period two. While the quantitative predictions of the 
SPE are not precisely supported by the data, the qualitative predictions regarding the influence of 
carryover on patterns of ticket purchases are supported.  The model predicts that carryover should result 
in higher first period ticket purchases relative to second period ticket purchases. The SPE predicts a 200 
ticket difference between first and second period purchases. Figures 4a and 4b show the average 
difference for each round for both low and high carryover sessions, for inexperienced sessions and 
experienced sessions, respectively. Although the early rounds of the low carryover sessions resulted in 
differences not equal to 200, there is a clear trend toward the predicted 200 ticket difference in later 
rounds. 
  The model also predicts that the presence of carryover should result in higher first period ticket 
purchases and lower second period ticket purchases relative to one-period contests. For all subjects 
participating in Part I (no carryover experiments), mean ticket purchases were 527.2 tickets.  Individual 
mean ticket purchases for no carryover sessions compared to inexperienced low carryover rounds shows 
that purchases for the two-period contests were not significantly higher in period one (p = 0.472, one-
tailed Mann-Whitney U test) but were significantly lower in period two (p = 0.000, one-tailed Mann-
Whitney U test).  Furthermore, averaging the mean ticket purchases from both periods of the 
inexperienced low carryover rounds results in 449.6 tickets per period, compared to 527.2 tickets per 
period for the one-period contests. Thus, while the model predicts no change in total rent seeking effort,   16
we have evidence of lower effort in the low carryover design (p = 0.002, one-tailed Mann-Whitney U 
test). The increase in rent-seeking effort that occurred in the first period of the two-period contest relative 
to the one-period contest was more than offset by the decrease in effort in the second round. 
 
Results for high carryover design 
  This section reports the results from the sessions with a ‘high’ carryover rate of ½. Figures 5a and 
5b present the frequency distribution of ticket purchases in the first and second periods for inexperienced 
and experienced subjects, respectively. For the inexperienced design, there were four sessions with 10 
participants and one session with 8 participants; because each subject made a ticket purchase in each 
period of the five rounds, there were a total of 480 recorded decisions. For the experienced design, there 
were five sessions with 10 participants for a total of 500 recorded decisions. Table 2 presents the raw data 
and summary statistics. 
  As was the case for the low carryover design, the qualitative predictions associated with the 
model are supported in the high carryover sessions. Average ticket purchases in the first period were 
640.4 tickets for the inexperienced sessions and 669.2 tickets for the experienced sessions; for the second 
period the average ticket purchases were 297.3 in the inexperienced sessions and 339.6 in the experienced 
sessions.  Differences in ticket purchases between experienced and inexperienced subjects were not 
statistically significant in either period (p = 0.688 and p = 0.335, respectively Mann-Whitney U test).  The 
SPE prediction is 600 tickets in period one and 0 tickets in period two. Therefore, for the high carryover 
design, the SPE predicts a 600 ticket difference between first and second period purchases. Figures 4a and 
4b show that, in all rounds, the average difference between first and second period expenditures is less 
than 600. However, as in the low carryover experiments, there is a trend toward the predicted 600 ticket 
difference. 
  Recall that for all subjects participating in Part I (no carryover experiments) mean ticket 
purchases were 527.2 tickets. For the high carryover sessions, individual mean ticket purchases for no 
carryover sessions compared to carryover rounds for the inexperienced sessions shows that purchases for   17
the two-period contests were significantly higher in period one (p = 0.006, one-tailed Mann-Whitney U 
test) and were significantly lower in period two (p = 0.000, one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test) when 
compared to mean ticket purchases in the one-period contests.  As such, in both low and high carryover 
treatments, ticket purchases were lower in the second period, and the differences from the no carryover 
decisions were statistically significant. While ticket purchases were higher in the first period of both low 
and high carryover sessions relative to the no carryover sessions, the first period differences were 
statistically significant only in the high carryover case.   
  Furthermore, averaging the mean ticket purchases from both periods of the inexperienced high 
carryover rounds results in 468.9 tickets per period, compared to 527.2 tickets per period for the one-
period contests. Thus, as was the case for the low carryover design, ticket purchases were lower on 
average in the carryover rounds resulting in lower levels of rent dissipation (p = 0.020, one-tailed Mann-
Whitney U test). 
 
Comparison of low carryover and high carryover 
  This section compares the results from the low and high carryover sessions.  Our model predicts 
that increasing the rate of carryover will increase first period ticket purchases and decrease second period 
ticket purchases.  For our experimental design, the SPE changes from 400 to 600 in period 1 and from 
200 to 0 in period 2 when the carryover rate is raised from ¼ to ½ .  As can be seen from Table 1 and 
Table 2, in both experienced and inexperienced sessions, average ticket purchases rose in the first period 
when the rate of carryover was increased from low to high.  For both experienced and inexperienced 
subjects, the differences in average first period tickets purchases between low and high carryover 
treatments are statistically significant (p =0.007 and p = 0.028, respectively one tailed Mann Whitney U 
test).   Differences in the second period distributions are not statistically significant, and the qualitative 
results are mixed: for inexperienced subjects, average ticket purchases were lower in the high carryover 
treatment (which is consistent with out theory), but for experienced subjects average ticket purchases 
were higher in the high carryover treatment (contrary to the model’s prediction.).  The results, therefore,   18
provide qualified support for the prediction that the level of forward shifting of expenditures is correlated 
with the rate of carryover. 
  
Multivariate Analysis 
  Further comparisons between treatments are made using regression analysis. The data consist of 
multiple observations for each subject (i.e., individuals played repeatedly for multiple rounds). As it is 
panel data, each dimension has the potential for heterogeneity: time (round) and individual. To allow for 
time effects we include a round trend in our specification. To capture possible heterogeneity across 
individuals, which is expected in such experiments, we use GLS random effects. The regression results 
from three specifications are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable in all regressions is tickets 
purchased. The regressions include dummy variables indicating if the purchase was made in either the 
first or second period of either a low or high carryover round. Additionally, a trend variable for round and 
a dummy variable for experience are included. Regression 2 also controls for whether the subject won in 
the previous round. Regression 3 further controls for both the opponent’s expenditure in the previous 
round and the difference between a player’s ticket purchase last round and their opponent’s ticket 
purchase in the last round. The omitted variable in Regressions 1, 2, and 3 is the dummy variable 
indicating a non-carryover round. 
  The regression results support the earlier observations regarding relative ticket purchases and 
indicate that round and experience are insignificant. First period purchases in carryover rounds, relative to 
purchases in non-carryover rounds, are higher on average (positive coefficients) in both low and high 
carryover situations. Furthermore, the difference in first period purchases for high carryover rounds is 
larger (and significant) suggesting that the higher carryover rate induces higher first period purchases as 
predicted by the theory. Similarly, relative to non-carryover rounds, second period purchases in carryover 
rounds are significantly lower on average (negative coefficients) in both low and high carryover 
situations. The difference in second period purchases for high carryover rounds is greater.  In general, the 
regressions confirm the qualitative theoretical prediction that, relative to multiple periods of non-  19
carryover contests, the introduction of carryover shifts expenditures forward from later to earlier periods, 
and that the extent of forward shifting is positively correlated with the rate of carryover. 
  Regression models 2 and 3 also indicate that subjects tend to exert more rent-seeking effort when 
they were the winner of the previous round. This suggests a possible positive feedback response from 
winning that increases the subject’s desire to win the next round. Furthermore, subjects appear to make 
higher expenditures the higher the other player’s expenditure, and the greater the difference between the 
other player’s expenditure and their own in the previous round. This suggests the presence of a 




  Our theoretical model predicts that rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward from later to earlier 
periods, with no change in total rent-seeking expenditures relative to a non-carryover contest of the same 
duration. This implies that there is no effect on rent dissipation, that is, no net gain or loss in efficiency 
when a rent-seeking environment involves expenditure carryover. Furthermore, our model predicts that 
the shift forward in rent-seeking expenditures is larger when carryover rates are higher. 
Although we observe over-investment relative to the equilibrium predictions (a common 
phenomenon in rent-seeking experiments), our experimental results confirm the qualitative prediction that 
rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward when expenditure carryover is allowed. These results also 
indicate that a higher carryover rate leads to a greater increase in rent-seeking effort in the first period, 
and a greater decrease the second period, as the theory predicts. Finally, it is interesting to note that in our 
experiments average rent-seeking expenditures are lower in a two-period carryover contest than in an 
equivalent non-carryover contest. This suggests that, although our model predicts no change in rent 
dissipation, rent dissipation may be reduced when rent-seeking expenditures carryover between rounds.   20
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End Notes 
                                                           
1 See Nitzan (1994) for an overview. 










 where R can be thought of as the marginal effectiveness of rent-seeking expenditures.  When 
R=1, this probability is the proportion of total effort given by player 1.  As R approaches infinity the game 
becomes an auction with the player expending the most effort capturing the rent.  In our model we assume 
R=1. 
3 A full derivation of equations (7) – (9) is available from the authors by request.  
4 Assuming non-negative rent-seeking expenditures bounds the equilibrium first-period expenditures at 
two times the single period NE level. Otherwise, (7) implies that equilibrium first-period expenditures 
approach infinity as δ  approaches one. Similarly, (9) implies that equilibrium expenditures in the final 
period approach negative infinity as δ  approaches one. In some cases, it may be reasonable to allow 
negative rent-seeking expenditures in later periods. For example, rent-seeking capital investments could 
be liquidated in later periods, thereby recovering expenditures that were made earlier. 
5 The initial design we implemented involved all subjects playing 5 rounds of a one-period contest (Part I) 
followed by all subjects playing 5 rounds of a two-period contest (Part II). The importance of examining 
behavior in two-period carryover contests without prior experience in a one-shot contest was suggested by 
Charles Plott and an anonymous referee. We did not implement two-period contests (Part II) followed by 
the one-period contests (Part I). However, our 10 additional sessions (Part II only) allow us to examine 
the role prior experience plays when we compare the results to the sessions that had the one-period 
contests followed by the two-period contests.  
6 The draw was implemented using a computerized random number generator in the form of a spinning 
wheel that allowed the experimenters to enter subject ticket purchases and conducted the draws using the 
associated probabilities.  Our spinning wheel was adapted from one developed by David R. Schmidt. 
Therefore, the subject with the highest contribution was not guaranteed to win. The experimenters 
informed subjects about the random draw and it was performed on a visible computer. 
7 The expected earnings table and the expected earnings calculator can be found at the rent-seeking links 
found on http://www.usna.edu/Users/econ/pschmitt/experiments.htm. 
8 The choice was made to inform subjects about the other player’s expenditures so that subjects could 
calculate the probability they faced of winning each contest. Informing subjects, after the fact, about the 
other player’s expenditure does not affect the equilibrium prediction. We also do not expect any 
reputation effects as subjects are randomly re-paired. However, we do recognize that this information may 
have other psychological effects, and we include this information in the data analysis. 
9 Millner and Pratt (1989) also test the impact of changing the marginal effectiveness of rent-seeking 
expenditures (i.e., the parameter R). Their results (using R =1 and R =3) indicate that increasing the 
marginal effectiveness of rent-seeking increases expenditures. However, they also find that mean 
expenditures are less than the Nash equilibrium for R =3. 
10 Shogren and Baik (1991) also show that when R =3 no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.   22
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Figure 2: Average Ticket Purchases for Non-Carryover Rounds  
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Figure 4a: Difference between Period 1 and Period 2 Ticket Purchases for   


















































Figure 4b: Difference between Period 1 and Period 2 Ticket Purchases for   
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Table 1: Low Carryover Results 
TICKETS 
 
PERIOD 1  
FREQUENCY 
INEXPERIENCED 
PERIOD 2  
FREQUENCY 
INEXPERIENCED
PERIOD 1  
FREQUENCY 
EXPERIENCED 
PERIOD 2  
FREQUENCY 
EXPERIENCED 
0 6  29  2  28 
100 32  59  16  40 
200 19  35  12  44 
300 26  35  23  54 
400 34  20  36  13 
500 36  24  49  34 
600 23  11  30  15 
700 5  5  19  6 
800 15  8  32  1 
900 7  4  6  2 
1000 18  8  7  2 
1100 5  3  0  0 
1200 10  5  3  0 
1300 2  0  1  0 
1400 0  1  1  0 
1500 12  3  3  1 
        
Mean 552.4  346.8  541.25  293.75 
Median 500  300  500  300 
Mode 500  100  500  300 
Std Dev  382.36  326.74  271.23  221.64 
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Table 2: High Carryover Results 
TICKETS 
 
PERIOD 1  
FREQUENCY 
INEXPERIENCED 
PERIOD 2  
FREQUENCY 
INEXPERIENCED 
PERIOD 1  
FREQUENCY 
EXPERIENCED 
PERIOD 2  
FREQUENCY 
EXPERIENCED
0 6  51  2  35 
100 23  26  8  26 
200 9  38  8  42 
300 15  34  27  46 
400 18  27  16  22 
500 32  29  38  35 
600 24  14  22  21 
700 25  9  38  7 
800 20  4  28  6 
900 19  0  15  2 
1000 23  6  18  1 
1100 1  0  6  0 
1200 11  0  15  5 
1300 1  0  1  1 
1400 4  0  2  1 
1500 8  1  6  0 
        
Mean 640.4  297.25  669.2  339.6 
Median 600  300  700  300 
Mode 500  0  700  300 
Std Dev  363.26  255.04  320.10  267.50 
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Table 3: Random-Effects GLS Regression Results 
 Regression  1 
Rounds 1 – 10 
Regression 2 
Rounds 1 – 10 
Regression 3 
Rounds 1 – 10 
Number of 
observations 
2450 1960 1960 
Overall R















































































– –  0.05 
(2.23
**) 
Coefficients (z-stats in parentheses)  
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
 